I hate it. I hate it all so much. It's going to take the finesse out of running an engine and handicap some very skilled engineers because of a few bad eggs.

>>131921 Eh, don't hate on PTC man. Hate on those who are wrapping PTC into programs that tell the engineer how to run their train. Last week BLET petitioned the FRA to stop the mandatory use of locomotive driving aids (namely NS's LEADER and Trip Optimizer) citing a number of safety issues. Personally I hope this petition gains traction with the FRA.

It's one thing to enforce speed limits and signal indications as PTC, at it's core, is supposed to do. Yet taking the control of a train away from a well trained professional and mandating said programs use is another. It sounds great on paper (pic related) but in reality the autopilot is not everything it's cracked up to be.

>>131942
There's going to be an element that gives up control no matter what course you take. The software is going to try to bring the train to a halt BEFORE an unsafe condition arises. That's where it gets fuzzy. At what point is action required? A good engineer might be able to get his train down to speed for a slow order a lot sooner than the computer thinks he can, and will initiate braking miles in advance instead of maybe half a mile.

It's the nature of the beast, and I don't like it.

>>131944
Don't worry, I'm sure they'll be an override button just like every other cab signalling system that has ever been conceived.

>>131949
And if there isn't, someone in the BLET will improvise one.

>>131949
Have you ever seen those cab signal cut out switches? They're in a locked panel and you have to break glass or a lock to get to it and it has all these warnings like "DO NOT BREAK OR MODIFY WITHOUT AUTHORITY: NORFOLK SOUTHERN POLICE WILL PROSECUTE" etc.

>>131951

>implying the existing incab signalling buttons present on freight locos will have anything to do with PTC

Every existing cab signal I've seen has an override button of some sort. Be it AWS, ACSES, TVM, KVB, LZB, etc.

I'm nowhere near an authority figure in this, but I simply can't see a simple override switch existing on what's designed as a life saving system.

>>131967
Systems like AWS are also supposed to save lives but they still have a big yellow button to override the system.

>>131969
It's not an override button, it's an acknowledgement button. If you don't press it, AWS slams on the brakes.

>>131944
If the program is smart enough, it can control speed to minimize fuel use and maintenance. Braking the train in half a mile might be perfectly safe, but less efficient.

Is it smart enough? Of course not, but it avoids the outliers of especially poor (or excellent) engineers. That's what's happening nearly everywhere, through some combination of automation and assessment, with the sad outcome of the excellent professionals leaving and lowering industry competence in almost every area assessed.

>>131950
I'm sure supervisors will give them hell for using it, and for not using it, both at the same time!

>>131942
Overuse of autopilot has drained skill from pilots and along with pilot-by-wire systems arguably contributed to disasters such as Air France 447.

"Ambrose? I know you've worked sixty-seven hours straight during this blizzard, but 70's awfully late, and it would be a mighty good thing if you went out looking for her,"

>>131974

>arguably contributed to disasters such as Air France 447.

Arguable, but only by retards whose understanding of said disasters comes from an article they read in the Daily Mail. Anyone with at least any knowledge of how 447 happened will tell you otherwise.

>>131977

>retards whose understanding of said disasters comes from an article they read in the Daily Mail

Yeah I guess you'd be the expert in that.